Thrall v. St. Luke\u27s Regional Medical Center Appellant\u27s Reply Brief Dckt. 41991 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
9-16-2014
Thrall v. St. Luke's Regional Medical Center
Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 41991
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Thrall v. St. Luke's Regional Medical Center Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 41991" (2014). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 4890.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/4890
GREG LAWSON ISB # 9076 
HAMMOND LAW OFFICE. PA 
811 East Chicago Street 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
Telephone: (208) 453 - 4857 
Facsimile: (208) 453 -- 486 l 
Email: greg@hammondlawoffice.com 
Attorney for Claimant-Appellant 
BEFORE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
JOAN M. THRALL 
Claimant-Appellant 
V. 
ST. LUKES REGIONAL MEDICAL 
CENTER 
Employer/Respondent, and 
BOISE PATHOLOGY GROUP. P.A. 
Major Base Employer/Respondent, and 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LAIH)R. 
Respondent. 
SUPREME COURT No.: 41991 
IDOL #!961-2014 
REPLY BRIEF OF THE CLAIMANT-
APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Idaho Industrial Cornmis,,1011. Mark Richmond. Appeals Examiner presiding. 
Greg Lawson 
Hammond Law Office, P.,'\. 
811 E. Chicago St. 
Caldwell. ID 83605 
Attorney for the Claimant/Appellant 
Boise Pathology Group. P.A. 
190 E. Bannock St. 
Boise. ID 83712 
Respondent 
Tracey K. Rolfsen 
Deputy Attorney General 
317W.MainSt. 
Boise. ID 83735 
Attorney for Respondent Idaho DOL 
Christine M. Salmi 
Perkins Coie. LLP 
! l l 1 \Vest Jefferson St., Ste. 500 
Boise. ID 83 702 
Attorney for Respondent St. Luke's 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF C n ............................................................ 3 
ISSUES PRESENTED ,1 ,. ...................................................................... ,. 
,'\RGlJMENT ................................................................................................... 4 
l. No SLBSTANTIAL AM) C:Oiv1PETENT EV !DENCE SL1PPORTS THE corvlMISS!ON'S 
FINDING THAT Ms. THRALL VOLUNTARILY QUIT HER EMPLOY,v1ENT WITHOUT 
GOOD CAl;SE .................................................................................. 6 
2. PUTlfNG THE ONUS ON CLAl\1AN r IO PROVE THE ABSENCE OF MISCONDUCT 
IS NOT HARMLESS ERROR ..................................................................... 9 
3. No SUBSTANTIAL AI\JD COi\lPETENT EVIDENCE EXISTS TO SUPPORT THE 
Corvr-v11ss10;,(s FINDING Tl IAT Ms. THRALL WAS DISCHARGED FOR 
:vHSCO"iDl'C·r ............................................................................... 6 
CC)NCLUSION ............................................................................................... 9 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ............................................................................. 10 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 2 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Adams v. Aspen Water. Inc .. 
150 Idaho 408 (2011) .............. . 
Beaty v. Citv of1daho Foils. 
. . . 
Page(s) 
. ..................................... 7 
110 Idaho at 892 ( 1986) ............................................................................................................ 7 
Carter v. Town of Benton, 
827 F. Supp. 2d ......................................................................................................................... 4 
Chapman v. NYK Line N. Am .. Inc· .. 
147 Idaho 178 (2009) ............................................................................................................... 7 
Desi/et v. Glass Doctor, 
142 Idaho 655 (2006) ..................................................................................... 7 
Grieb v. Unemployment Comp. Bd o/Re,•iew, 
573 Pa. 594. 603 (2003) ................................................................................ .. 8 
Holly v. Unemployment Comv Bel Of Rei·it11·, 
617 A .. 2d 80, 83-84 .................................................................................................................... 8 
In re Potlatch Forests. Inc .. 
72 Idaho 291 (1952) ....................................................................................... 9 
Jackson v. Minidoka !rrigution /)iff. 
98 Idaho 330 (1977) ........ . . ................................................................................ 4 
Kivalu v. Life Care Centen o/Llm. 
142 Idaho 262 (2005) ..................................................................................... 8 
Rigoli v. Wal-Marr Associates. Inc .• 
151 Idaho 707 (2011) ..................................................................................... 7 
Roll v. City of A1iddleton. 
105 Idaho 22, 25. ( 1983) ........................................................................................................... 8 
Wroble v. Bonners Ferry Ranger s·tation 
97 Idaho 900 (1976) ................................................................................................................ 6 
IDAHO STATUTES 
I.(~. § 72-732 ..................... ..., ................................................................................................ 6 
Idaho Admin. Code 09.01. ........................................... 6-7 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BR!fT 3 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Claimant is not seeking to reweigh the evidence or to change findings of credibility, but is 
asking this Court to apply existing statutory and case la\\ regarding termination, burden of proof 
and misconduct to the factual findings uf tl1t: Commissi@. 
ARGUMENT 
l. NO SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE COM:VHSSION'S 
FINDING THAT Ms. THRALL VOLlJNTARILY QUIT HER EMPLOYMENT WITHOUT 
GOOD CAUSE. 
Respondent misunderstands the concept of a fixced resignation. A forced resignation 
does not necessarily consist only of the use of actual force or coercion to sign a resignation. 
Instead a ··forced resignation"' normally occurs when an employee is given the opportunity to 
resign in lieu of termination. See ( or/er v. Tmi-n of Benton, 827 F. Supp. 2d 700 (resignation in 
Dist., 98 Idaho 330, (1977). Whether Ms. Thrall was told at that meeting she would be 
immediately terminated or not is not dispositive of the issue. "The test is whether sufficient 
words or actions by the employer would logically lead a prudent man to believe his tenure had 
been terminated.'' Jackson l'. 1'vlinidoku Irrigation DisL 98 Idaho 330, 334-35 (1977) Calling an 
at \Vil! employee into the office just after she had made a mistake and offering her a chance to 
resign because it will be in her best interest sends a clear message that would lead any prudent 
person to believe her tenure was terminated. 
The Commission ·s decision emphasizes that Ms. Thrall .. chose" to resign. R., Vol. I, p. 
20. Respondent further argues that because Ms. Thrall spent time considering and discussing 
with her employer whether or not to resign that she must have had options to weigh. This new 
assertion runs counter to the Respondent's ovvn testimony at hearing. in the transcript 
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of the hearing. Commission· s Decision. or even m the Respondent's brief is there a choice 
offered to Thrall other resign or fired. the record indicates that, prior to 
being called in and asked to resign, Thrall had made attempts to transfer or find a more 
suitable situation. Tr., p. 22 iincs 12-13 In light of the undisputed fact that Ms. Thrall would 
have been terminated that day if she had not chosen to resign, she was then only choosing 
between termination and resignation. The case law of our sister states and previous rulings by 
this Court indicate that the Commission erred by ruling this type of "choice" constitutes a 
voluntary quit for the purposes of unemployment benefit eligibility. 
Not only is this decision contrary to established law. it punishes those employees with a 
strong desire to find future employment. The main incenti\'e for employees to agree to a 
resignation in lieu of termination is that they will more easily be able to secure employment in 
the future. Prospective employers almost without exception ask if a potential employee has been 
terminated in the past. By ruling that this type of forced resignation is a voluntary quit the 
Commission has discouraged employees who care about future job prospects from making 
themselves more easily employable in the future. 
2. PUTnt·--iG THE ONUS O?\ CL1\li\l/\NT TO PROVE THE ABSENCE OF MISCONDUCT 
IS NOT HARMLESS ERROR. 
The Commission stated in its decision that the --claimant has not demonstrated that her 
imminent discharge would have been for reasons other than misconduct." As stated in 
Claimant's Opening Brief it is well established that an employer bears the burden to prove 
misconduct. A reversal of this burden of proof is anything but harmless and explains how the 
Commission could find misconduct v,hen the Examiner found the Respondent "presented 
no competent evidence to that the claimant did not perform her job duties as expected or 
that she was discharged misconduct.. ... (R .. Vol. l p. 1 16-1 Further. the Commission 
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has seemingly failed to account for Thrall"s testimony that physical ailments and vision 
problems explained the trouble she was having at ,vork when it stated, ·'She did not provide a 
reason for why she \Vas able to adequately perform her job before. but had ongoing problems 
with patient identification as of ·1 2013.'. (R., Vol. l p. 3 L. 13) The above statement is not a 
finding that Ms. Thrall's testimony is not credible but simply an indication that the Commission 
missed said testimony. Further. even if this Court can scrape up enough evidence to theoretically 
find misconduct, it would he mere appropriate to remand this issue back to the Commission to 
apply the correct burden of proof, base a decision on all of the evidence in the record, and to 
issue more detailed findings of fact as this Court did in Vernon v. Omark Indus., 113 Idaho 358 
(1987). 
3. No SLfBSTi\:\TL\L _,\ ~,1) C()l\lPETENT EVlf)LNC:E EXfSTS TC) SLJPPC)RT THE 
COf\Hv!ISSl01'(s FIM)f'\(i THAT Ms. Tl!R!\LL WAS DISCHARGED FOR 
MISCONDUCT. 
The essence of Respondent's argument seems to be that because more than one mistake 
was made, a disregard of the employers standards of behavior has occurred. While the subjective 
intent to harm ones employer is not necc.·ssary to constitute misconduct under this test, the terms 
·'disregard .. and ·'standard of behavior" indicate misconduct must be something more than good 
faith errors. IDAPA 09.01.30.275.02.c and Wrohle r. Bonners Feny Ranger Station, 97 Idaho 
900, (1976) help to clari(y what types of actions constitute misconduct and which do not. 
Respondent asks this Court to disregard Wrobf e because it dealt with an intentional lie and not an 
accidental mistake. However, the ruie in Wroble should apply even more firmly to an 
unintentional mistake than to an intentional one. This Court has previously rejected the 
proposition that "any discharge tbat is reasonably based on the employer's own rules will always 
result in a denial of the discharged employee's unemployment benefits." Beaty v. City of Idaho 
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Falls. l l 0 Idaho at 892 ( l see (_ 'Jwpnwn v. } K Line . Inc 147 Idaho 178 
(2009). lDAPA 09.01.30.275.02.c indicates that the exceptions are not solely reserved for one 
time onlv Rather. they delineate difference between a disregard for a standard 
behavior and an honest mistake made in good faith. 
Nothing in the record indicates that Ms. Thrall was failing to follow a known procedure 
or that she disregarded any rules or policies of the employer. The record reflects that she 
inadvertently mislabeled specimens on a few occasions due in part to physical ailments and 
vision problems Tr._ p .. 22 lines 20-25. That the applicable IDOL regulations make allowances 
for inefficiency, failure of good perfrmnance due to inability or incapacity, etc. indicate that they 
contemplate not only one time mistakes but situations in which the employee is attempting to do 
everything that is asked of them but is falling short through no fault of her own and no failure to 
abide by the rules. 
The difference ·between a disregard for a rule or procedure and an accidental mistake is 
demonstrated in Idaho case la\V determining misconduct under the standard of behavior test. 
Workers have been held to be ineligible f<x unemployment benefits due to misconduct involving 
extended absence vvithout permission "'1 dams v. ,1spen Water. Inc., 150 Idaho 408 (2011 ), using 
vulgar language that showed disrespect for management in presence of other employees. Rigali v. 
Wal-Afar/ Associates. Inc., 151 Idaho 707 (2011 ), failing a random drug test Desi/et v. Glass 
Doctor. 142 Idaho 655 (2006) showing a disregard for employers rules and policies through 
constant tardiness Roll v. ( 'ity of i\fidd!eton, l 05 Idaho 22 ( 1983 ), and where a nurse failed to 
follow policy by pre-completing charts when he \Vas asked not to Kivalu v. Life Centers 
Am .. 142 Idaho 262 (2005). Unlike the case before the Court. the previous cases for which this 
Court has upheld a finding of misconduct for disregarding a standard of behavior involve a 
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disregard of a known policy or rule, not an accident or mistake. Respondent also implies that 
hospital safety icated if employees terminated for mere negligence were 
given unemployment benefits. This claim is without merit as eligibility for unemployment 
benefits 111 no way interferes v,ith an employer's right to terminate employees at will for 
inefficiency or mistakes. nor does it encourage unsafe practices. 
Respondent further asks this Court to engage in rulernaking by holding certain 
professions to a higher standard as the Pennsylvania court did in Holly v. Unemployment Comp. 
Bd Of Review. 617 A.:2d 80. 83-84. What Respondent fails to do, however, is inform this Court 
that the rationale used by the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court in Holly was rejected and 
expressly overruled by Pennsylvania's mvn Supreme Court. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
held that the "Commonwealth Court's adoption of the public safety exception to this rule 
contravenes what the General Assembly provided for in Section 40:2(e), its application by the 
Commonwealth Court was improper. We are bound by the express words of the statute and 
cannot alter them to suit our own public policy predilections."" Grieb v. Unemployment Comp. 
Bd. olRevieH'. 573 Pa. 594. 603 (2003). Similarly, Idaho's unemployment laws do not provide 
for the courts or the Commission to apply higher level of standards for conduct based on the 
profession and doing so would only serve to thwart the humane purpose behind the statute. 
Respondent also makes similar arguments with regard to how severely the conduct affects 
the employer, stating that the misconduct here ·'work(ed) to undermine the very nature of the 
employer· s business .. :· (Brief of Employer-Respondent p. 15) The test for misconduct should 
not be centered around or his particular business. Rather the more appropriate 
to examine these issues ts the framework provided by the Idaho legislature 
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indicating that a disregard for a smndard of behavior constitutes misconduct, while mistakes, 
inadvertencies and inefficiency not 
CONCLUSION 
The Idaho Act \Vas enacted to help aileviate the economic and 
social hardships caused unemployment not resulting from the fault of the employee. LC. s 72-
1302. The Act must be libt>rally construed to effect that purpose. In re Potlatch Forests. Inc., 72 
Idaho 291 ( 1952). Claimant did everything she could to retain her employment and was forced to 
resign. The record indicates Claimant had no option to continue her employment with 
Respondent. Despite this, the Commission determined that she willingly quit her job. The 
Commision also incorrectly placed the burden of proof on Claimant to show that she was not 
terminated for misconduct and failed to account for her testimony regarding medical problems 
that led to her mistakes. This error of law regarding the burden of proof caused the Commission 
to incorrectly rule that Claimant committed misconduct. The record reflects that Claimant's 
mistakes were due to ordinary negligence and not due to any disregard for the Respondent's 
standards of behavior. Thcrefrirc, Claimant asks this Coun to reverse the decision of the 
Commission and reinstate her unemployment compensation benefits. 
DATED THIS 16th day of September, 2014 
... --,, ~ 
~~·· 
Attorney for the Appellant-Claimant 
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